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Abstract—Blockchain technology has pioneered a new consen-
sus approach to building a distributed public ledger globally.
A key feature expected from cryptocurrencies and blockchain
systems is the absence of a centralized control over the operation
process. That is, blockchain solutions should neither rely on
“trusted parties or powerful minority” for their operations, nor
introduce such centralisation tendencies into blockchain systems.
On the other hand, real-world blockchain systems require
steady funding for continuous development and maintenance of
the systems. Given that blockchain systems are decentralized
systems, their maintenance and developmental funding should
also be void of centralization risks. Therefore, secure and
“community-inclusive” long-term sustainability of funding is
critical for the health of blockchain platforms.
In this work, for the first time, we provide a systematic
exposition of blockchain development funding, planning, manage-
ment, and disbursement mechanisms aka “treasury systems” (for
cryptocurrencies and blockchain systems). Drawing from existing
literature, we identify and categorise various treasury models,
thereby enabling an exploration of their properties, benefits and
drawbacks. Particularly, we perform an evaluation of real-world
cryptocurrency treasury system of top cryptocurrencies e.g., Dash
governance system, and ZCash Foundation. Finally, we briefly
discuss desired properties of decentralised treasury systems and
provide suggestions for improvement or alternative solutions to
existing systems or implementations.
Index Terms—blockchain, sustainability, funding, treasury
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has pioneered a new consen-
sus approach to build a distributed public ledger globally.
Blockchains have become largely ubiquitous across various
sectors, e.g., technology, academia, medicine, economics and
finance, etc. Collectively, the net market capitalisation of
top cryptocurrencies exceeds 200 billion USD according to
CoinMarketCap.
Following the success of Bitcoin, a large number of
other cryptocurrencies have emerged in recent years. De-
spite this increase in the number of cryptocurrencies, se-
cure and “community-inclusive” long-term sustainability of
maintenance and developmental funding of cryptocurrencies
remains a serious issue for existing cryptocurrencies. Real-
world blockchain systems require continuous maintenance,
developmental projects and steady funding for continuous
growth of the systems.
Ideally, for blockchain systems, maintenance and develop-
mental funding should be decentralised. Given that blockchain
systems are distributed/decentralised systems, therefore, its
solutions (and by extension sustenance mechanisms) should
be void of centralisation risks. That is, blockchain solu-
tions should not rely on “trusted parties or powerful mi-
nority” for their operations or introduce such (centralisation)
tendencies into blockchain systems. Similarly, solutions on
blockchain systems ought to be compatible with core features
of blockchain systems, such as tamper-proof, decentralisation,
disintermediation, secure, and community-inclusive (open to
all), etc.
Our contributions. In the literature, the study of blockchain
sustainability mainly focuses on the environmental sustain-
ability and energy consumptions; namely, proof-of-X, where
X is some resource, stake, or combination of resources and
stake. Whereas, funding sustainability is an issue that has been
overlooked by the research community. Despite the increase
in the number of cryptocurrencies, secure sustainability of
maintenance and developmental funding of cryptocurrencies
remains a serious issue. Real-world blockchain platforms
require continuous maintenance, developmental projects and
steady funding for continuous growth.
Traditionally, blockchain platforms are developed (and
funded) by “founders”, who are either developers, investors,
researchers, etc., and typically they are responsible for driving
the direction and growth of the platforms. However, in recent
times, an alternative funding and decision making mechanism
for blockchain systems is the treasury system [1]. A treasury
system is a self-sustenance mechanism for the advancement of
blockchain systems [2]. The treasury system is a decentralised,
collaborative decision-making mechanism for cryptocurrencies
and blockchain systems.
We examine existing development funding and management
systems (viz-a-viz treasury systems) found in real-world cryp-
tocurrencies and evaluate them with a view to identifying
their strengths and weaknesses and provide suggestions for
improvement (towards achieving solutions which are com-
patible with core blockchain features). Briefly, we remark
that at the core of a truly decentralised treasury system are:
regular and “secure” source(s) of funds, community-inclusive
collaborative decision-making (with facilities to optimise col-
lective intelligence and experience), absence/minimisation of
centralisation risks, and (possibly) an enforcement mechanism
to ensure compliance with community-wide decisions. It is
important to note that a proportional amount of work in this
area stem from non-academic venues and sources (due to
the ubitquitous nature of cryptocurrencies). Particularly, this
is one area of research where practice seem to be ahead of
theory [3]. An important portion of resources for the research
comes from official websites of cryptocurrencies or third-party
service providers (e.g., Coinmarketcap), official and unofficial
chat forums (e.g., Reddit, Medium), mailing lists, Wiki pages,
GitHub, etc.
Roadmap. The remainder of this work is divided into sections
described as follows: Section II provides a high-level descrip-
tion of treasury systems for cryptocurrencies. In Section III, we
discuss various funding sources for blockchain/cryptocurrency
maintenance and development. Section IV provides an in-
sightful description and categorisation of the various trea-
sury models found on existing cryptocurrencies and beyond.
In Sections V, VI we explore known treasury systems for
cryptocurrencies by analysing details of their operations,
features, strengths and weaknesses. We examine how these
pioneer blockchain platforms address pertinent problems such
as decision-making participants and rules, and privacy, fund
utilisation, etc. (and their relevance towards developing secure
treasury systems for sustainable blockchain technologies).
Finally, we conclude the report with a brief summary of
key findings and insights, as well as recommendations for
improvement and future treasury systems in Section VIII.
II. TREASURY SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Simply put, a treasury system is a “self-sustenance” mech-
anism for blockchain platforms (particularly cryptocurrenies).
Treasury on cryptocurrencies encompasses funding source,
development, maintenance and advancement of the underlying
cryptocurrency [2], as well as decision-making, and long-
term sustainability. In blockchain technologies, a treasury
system is a decentralised means of achieving and ensuring
continued existence and improvement of its parent-system
(e.g., cryptocurrency) by providing a regular source of funding
for projects relevant to the survival and growth of the system.
These projects include marketing, software development,
legal fees, advertising and publicity, etc. Typically, a
treasury system covers proposal submissions (and discus-
sions/feedbacks), community-inclusive collaborative decision-
making mechanism for reaching decisions on proposals, and
a securely reliable and sustainable means of funding for the
treasury. Furthermore, treasury parameters and features should
be compatible with, and reflect real-life choices and scenarios
in which the blockchain community/proposers are expected to
function. For example, a potential period for treasury systems
is 30 days (one month) expressed in corresponding number
of blocks in the blockchain. A justification for such a choice
is its practicality and compatibility with the real-world (e.g.,
slalaries are paid monthly), as well as other benefits (e.g., suf-
ficeintly reasonable time for planning, meetings, discussions,
decision-making, etc.) it offers [2]. Additionally, we highlight
below, pertinent issues that are essential to treasury system.
First, a collaborative decision-making mechanism e.g., a
voting scheme. Treasury systems should integrate mechanisms
that facilitates community-inclusive collaborative decision-
making in order to maximise the collective-intelligence of
the cryptocurrency community in particular and blockchain
ecosystem at large. In addition to collective-decision mak-
ing, flexible voting rules, that reflect the peculiarities of the
blockchain rather than general voting rules, is important to
the utility of treasury systems. For instance, a simple majority
voting rule may not suffice for all situations, especially, for
high-risk proposals that request huge amounts of funds.
Second, a secure and sustainable treasury funding mecha-
nism. In addition to contributions from block rewards (i.e.,
taxation of miners’ rewards), the treasury system should ac-
commodate other funding means such as voluntary donations,
or other external funding sources. This option is particularly
useful when the tax from block rewards becomes small (as a
result of decrease in block rewards) or as a result of money
supply limit being reached and only transaction fees make up
block rewards.
Third, thorough stakeholder participation and community-
driven treasury. Game-theoretically efficient incentive struc-
ture / reward mechanism further drives increased stakeholder
participation in treasury process, and also helps ensure that
incentives do not lead to hyper-inflation which can diminish
cryptocurrency value.
Fourth, blockchain and stakeholders’ security and privacy.
For instance, an adversary who carries out Sybil attacks (by
distributing his stake into multiple addresses each with smaller
stakes) should gain no advantage by so doing, and the vote of
stakeholders should be weighted relative to their stake in the
system. Additionally, participation in treasury activity should
not compromise the security and privacy of participants.
Finally, other desirable treasury system properties include:
treasury refund/recall mechanism, project spending/milestone
monitoring scheme, on-chain consensus and history verifica-
tion for all proposals, etc.
We now discuss the main sources of development funding
for cryptocurrencies (or their treasury system).
III. FUNDING SOURCES
Funding is a critical tool necessary for the development
and maintenance of any real-world cryptocurrency. The major
sources of development funding on blockchain systems include
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), donations (charity), taxations,
venture capitalists (investor funding), and patron organisations.
Today, cryptocurrencies largely rely on one (or a combination)
of the above-listed sources for development funding and
maintenance.
A. Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)
ICO is a means of crowd-funding done by issuing some
cryptocoins to investors, or other individuals, in exchange for
other cryptocurrencies (usually Bitcoin or Ethereum) or a fiat
currency. Typically, most ICOs are deployed as smart contracts
that receive funds and distribute equivalent amount of the
new or underlying cryptocurrency to the investors at a later
date [4]. Technologies such as the ERC20 which facilitate easy
development of ICOs have enabled increase in the number
of ICOs in the cryptocurrency community. Usually, investors
buy these tokens in expectation that their value may rise if
project/company offering the ICO is successful in the future.
ICOs represent a good way to raise reasonable amount of
money to support cryptocurrency development within a short
period of time. For instance, projects such as Basic Attention
Token and Aragon [5], [6] were able to respectively raise
35 million USD and 25 million USD in 30 seconds and 15
minutes.
Due to the successes recorded by early ICOs, there have
been a rise in number of ICOs for cryptocurrencies and other
blockchain-based technologies [7]. According to Cointele-
graph, approximately 4 billion USD (fiat currency equivalent)
was raised in 2017 alone. While ICOs are good, there are a
number of gray issues associated with the legality of ICOs. For
example, are ICO-tokens utility tokens or financial security?
Unfortunately, some ICOs have been used in Ponzi schemes
and financial scams. Moreover, recently there have been an
apparent decline in the rate of successful ICOs, perhaps due
to an increase in the number of speculative projects carrying
out ICOs.
Evidently, ICOs are valuable for initial development or
starting out a project due to the amount of funds that can
be raised in a short span of time. However, the uncertainties
surrounding the amount of funds that can be raised at any given
time make them unsuitable for funding treasury. Furthermore,
they are incompatible with the methodical planning and reli-
able funding that is expected of decentralised cryptocurrency
treasury systems. In other words, an obvious drawback is that
ICOs are not suitable for long-term planning of cryptocur-
rency maintenance and development. Therefore, ICOs do not
represent a sustainable development funding mechanism for
cryptocurrencies.
B. Donations
Donations, perhaps, is the oldest and most common
means of cryptocurrency development funding. “Develop-
ers/founders” of a cryptocurrency rely on donations from char-
ity e.g., from the public, stakeholders, or other third parties,
for cryptocurrency development funding. Although, donations
represent an alternative funding mechanism to ICOs, they are
not without their own pitfalls. For instance, Bitcoin through its
foundation- The Bitcoin Foundation (whose goal is to increase
global acceptance of Bitcoin) - have developed via reliance on
donations and membership registration fees, however, there
have been instances where development activities have been
threatened because of low availability of funds. For instance,
in 2015, Olivier Janssens (who later became a board member
of the Foundation) published a note on the Bitcoin Foundation
forum where he stated that the Foundation was seriously
struggling with funds. Moreover, BitcoinCore, an open source
endeavour responsible for the maintenance of the Bitcoin
client [8], also runs a sponsorship program - the Bitcoin Core
Sponsorship Programme - through which top companies and
industry players can contribute to the development of the
cryptocurrency.
For the Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency, developers or
proposers (planning to execute cryptocurrency development
projects) discuss details of their proposals (including the
amount of funds needed) on the “getmonero forum” and seek
donations from other community members who see value in
the proposals and their contribution to the overall growth of
the Monero blockchain.
Although, donations are useful for cryptocurrency devel-
opment funding, solely, they are not suitable for long-term
methodical planning and sustainability of cryptocurrencies.
Planning is difficult if funding is only available through
donations. Meticulous planning for blockchain development
activities is impractical under the donations model due to
uncertainties about the amount of funds that will be available
at any period of time. Furthermore, donations could introduce
centralisation in the system. For instance, “popular donors”
(not malicious) may take advantage of the model to influence
decisions in the system to their favour. In contrast, a malicious
adversary or donor may try to influence the system in ways
that are detrimental to the sustainability and growth of the
system. For instance, this may be done to cripple the system
due to the adversary holding a large stake in an altcoin or
competitor cryptocurrency.
C. Taxations
Taxation is an alternative development funding source found
on existing cryptocurrencies such as Dash, ZenCash, ZCash,
etc. By design, a fraction of block rewards (payment for
finding new block) is taken and contributed to a decentralised
treasury, or the coin company (investors/founders of the cryp-
tocurrency), or some other bodies providing services to the
cryptocurrency. For instance, 10% of miners’ rewards on the
Dash blockchain is contributed to a central pool, from which
developers and other community members can request for
funds for proposals that will advance the Dash blockchain.
For ZCash, 10% of the 21 million ZEC (that will be mined
on the network) represents tax (aka “Founders Rewards”) that
will be distributed among founders, investors, employees, and
advisors.
Taxation, perhaps, is the most sustainable of all cryp-
tocurrency development funding sources because it is a
blockchain sustenance mechanism derived from activities on
the blockchain. Furthermore, it lends itself to methodical plan-
ning which is necessary for disintermediation protocols such
as cryptocurrencies. Therefore, taxation which is obtainable
from miners’ rewards (and possibly transaction fees) represent
a good treasury fund source. However, additional funding
schemes may be required because of the decreasing miners’
reward which is a common feature of most cryptocurrencies.
Accordingly, a hybrid treasury funding source, such as one that
combines taxation with donations or minting (to supplement
the shortage from diminishing miners’ reward) represents a
more robust and sustainable blockchain funding source.
D. Minting
Minting can be described as a process that creates new coins
in a cryptocurrency. For example, this is referred to as coinbase
transaction in the Bitcoin blockchain. Basically, this is the
means by which proposers of new blocks get rewarded. The
miner or node proposing this block gets some new coins for
being the first to correctly solve a computational puzzle (proof-
of-work) or for being the leader of a committee responsible
for proposing a new block (proof-of-stake). Similarly, a related
approach can be used for rewarding community members
(or cryptocurrency stakeholders) who propose to, and carry
out projects that will advance the growth of the blockchain.
In other words, members who propose to execute tasks that
support cryptocurrency development can be funded by minting
only the amount of coins needed and awarding same to them,
to enable them carry out the projects.
Although minting provides stable funding for cryptocur-
rency development, if not well researched and implemented,
it is susceptible to abuse by proposers who are only interested
in taking funds from the system because of the “ seem-
ingly unlimited” availability of funds supply. Clearly, there
is need for thorough economic and game-theoretic analysis
to determine an optimum amount of coins that should be
minted (for funding projects in the system), and the number of
proposals that should be funded at any particular time. This
analysis is also necessary to determine the overall inflation
impact and implications for long-term growth and value of
the cryptocurrency.
E. Patron Organisations
Apart from ICOs, taxations and donations, patron organisa-
tions also provide services to support blockchain development.
For instance, Bitpay contributes to Bitcoin development by
funding wages of some Bitcoin Core developers. Furthermore,
industrial organisations can also contribute human resources
and services to the growth of a cryptocurrency. For instance, in
addition to providing funding to Bitcoin Core, BitStream also
contribute human resources to the Bitcoin cryptocurrency e.g.,
developers contributing to Bitcoin Core software. An obvious
drawback is that these organisations tend to wield ample
influence in decision-making on the development direction of
cryptocurrencies they support. Usually, these decisions tend
to occur in a centralised manner, and centralised sustenance
mechanisms that do not equally represent the interests of all
stakeholders are not appropriate for blockchains.
Conclusively, each of the above-listed blockchain devel-
opment funding sources, individually does not serve as a
secure, methodical and decentralised planning, funding source
for decentralised blockchain-based cryptocurrencies’ treasury
system.
Next, we discuss the models of treasury systems for
blockchain technologies. Although the proposed ontology for
treasury models is motivated by current solutions found in
existing cryptocurrencies, the classification also covers possi-
ble new treasury systems that could potentially be adopted by
other cryptocurrencies.
IV. TREASURY MODELS
A key motivation for classifying treasury system models is
to identify similarities, basic properties, strengths and weak-
nesses of the diverse groups, with a view to determining
their applicability to particular blockchain systems. A major
overarching attribute used in the classification of treasury
systems is the source of development funding for projects,
as well as the input and contribution of community members
of the cryptocurrency ecosystem (especially, people who hold
stake in the system).
Concretely, we identify three main models of treasury
systems:
• Open-System Treasury: This class consists of systems
where source of blockchain development funding are ex-
ternal to the system, e.g, Donations, Patron organisations,
industry, founders’ resources, etc. Additionally, participa-
tion in treasury activities such as decision-making, pro-
posal submission, proposal review, and project execution,
etc., are open to other members of the cryptocurrency,
rather than the cryptocurrency founders, developers and
company only.
• Closed-System Treasury: Under this category, all fund
sources are local to the system, i.e., within/from the
cryptocurrency. e.g, minting, taxation, and donations from
stakeholders of the cryptocurrency. Typically, decision-
making and cryptocurrency development processes are
organised in a centralised manner (e.g., by some organ-
isation) void of input from the general cryptocurrency
ecosystem.
• Hybrid-System Treasury: This category of treasury sys-
tems represents a combination of the features of the
closed and open-treasury systems. Under Hybrid-System
treasury, cryptocurrency development funding sources
comprise funds from within the cryptocurrency, and from
sources external to the system.
Following from the identified treasury models, we now discuss
sub-classes of treasury systems.
• Taxation-Community-Controlled (TCC)
Taxation is the primary source of project funding on
TCC treasury systems. The funds can be obtained by
taxing miners’ block rewards or block transaction fees or
a combination of both. The Dash governance system is a
classic example of a treasury system within the TCC class
because it relies on taxations of 10% of block rewards for
funding treasury (or fund pool).
Within this class of treasury system, project funding
decisions are reached through the use of community-
inclusive mechanisms such as voting. In other words,
funding decisions are made in a decentralised manner
(which prevents excessive centralisation of powers in the
hands of a few members). A variety of voting systems and
rules can be adopted for decision-making such as liquid
democracy, preferential voting, plurality voting, etc.
• Taxation-Organisation-Controlled (TOC)
TOC is very similar to TCC in terms of treasury funding
source. However, unlike TCC, decisions on how to use
funds within the treasury are made in a centralised
manner. Typically, an organisation or group of individuals
(usually company founders or investors) are responsible
for making funding decisions, with little or no input
from other members of the cryptocurrency ecosystem or
cryptocurrency stakeholders.
• Donation-Community-Controlled (DCC)
Under DCC, the major source of cryptocurrency develop-
ment funding comes from donations. This donation can
be obtained from community members, patron or chari-
table organisations with interest in the development of a
particular blockchain. For instance, Bitcoin Core receives
donations from individuals and corporate organisations,
for carrying out activities that support the continued
existence and growth of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency.
Similar to TCC, usage of funds within this treasury
class is decentralised. Funding decisions for proposals
are made through the use of community-inclusive mecha-
nisms, thereby supporting collaborative decision making.
• Donation-Organisation-Controlled (DOC)
Within this group of treasury system, funding available
for cryptocurrency development are sourced from do-
nations. That is, like DCC, DOC treasury systems are
also funded from donations received from charities and
corporate bodies or community members. For example,
proposers of projects that support the Monero cryptocur-
rency source for funding from donations made by other
community members.
Unlike DCC, DOC treasury decisions are made similarly
to that of TOC, i.e., centralised funding decision-making.
• Hybrid-Community-Controlled (HCC)
As the name suggests, within the HCC class funding
source is hybrid. Therefore, HCC treasury systems are
funded from a combination of sources such as taxation,
minting and donation.
Similar to other community controlled treasury system,
HCC treasury system make use of decentralised deci-
sion making mechanisms to reach funding decisions and
community members of the cryptocurrency are major
participants in the treasury process.
• Hybrid-Organisation-Controlled (HOC)
The source of funding for this class of treasury system
is similar to the HCC class explained above. However,
a major difference between the HCC class of treasury
system and the HOC class is the funding decision making
process. Within HCC treasury systems, funding decisions
are made in a centralised manner. In other words, the
community members or holders of stake in the cryptocur-
rency wield (little or) no power in the decision making
process on how funds are used. Typically, an organisation
responsible for the blockchain or cryptocurrency makes
all the decision regarding usage of funds within the HOC
class of treasury systems
We now examine existing treasury systems in real-world
cryptocurrencies by discussing their features (funding source,
decision-making and community participation), strengths and
potential drawbacks, etc.
V. CASE STUDY: DASH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
The Dash governance system (DGS) [9] also referred to as
Dash governance by blockchain (DGBB) is the pioneer trea-
sury implementation for cryptocurrency development funding
on any real-world cryptocurrency [10]. The DGS allows regu-
lar users on the Dash network to participate in the development
process of the Dash cryptocurrency by allowing them submit
project proposals (for advancing the cryptocurrency) to the
network. A subset of “special” nodes known as Masternodes
then vote to decide what proposals receive funding. Every
voting cycle (approximately one month), winning proposals
are voted for and funded from the accrued resources in the
blockchain treasury. 10% of all block rewards within each
monthly voting period is contributed towards the blockchain
treasury, from which proposals are then funded.
A. Proposals and Submissions
Projects willing to support the Dash cryptocurrency request
for funds through proposals by submitting a special transaction
(that burns some Dash to prevent DoS attack) on the net-
work [10]. Proposals include name, URL to detailed proposal,
date (start and end date for funding request), payment address
(if proposal is successful at voting), and the amount of funds
requested.
Every node on the network verify the validity of pro-
posal transactions (GOVERNANCE OBJECT PROPOSAL)
they have seen before adding them to their local “stor-
age” because the proposals are not stored on the Dash
blockchain. Following submission, proposers are expected
to publicise their submissions to other users (specifi-
cally Masternodes who vote) of the Dash community.
There are third-party tools and websites that support cam-
paigning, tracking and voting for proposals. For instance,
www.dashcentral.org, http://dashmasternode.org/masternode-
tools/, https://dashvotetracker.com/, etc.
B. Voting and Rules
The DGS has direct democracy as its system of decision-
making. That is, voters on the DGS vote directly on proposals
in the system using the Dash wallet or other third-party tools
or websites. Only Masternodes can vote on the DGS and they
can either vote “YES”, “NO”, or “ABSTAIN” implying “for”,
“against” or “neutral” respectively. Voting is done via a special
transaction that identifies the Masternode as well as the hash
of the proposal that is being voted on.
Similar to proposal submission, every node on the network
checks to confirm the validity of the votes before adding to
their internal storage (because like the proposals, the votes are
also not stored on the blockchain).
In order to be considered for funding at the end of voting (in
the payment stage), winning proposals are decided upon via
a fuzzy threshold voting scheme where the absolute amount
of votes for a winning project must be greater than a given
threshold. Specifically, for Dash governance system,
Vvotes = (Vyes − Vno) ≥ 0.1 ∗ |master nodes|
That is, only proposals with Vvotes are eligible for funding.
All eligible proposals are then ranked in a descending order
according to the amount of net votes they receive and are
funded accordingly until the available budget is exhausted.
Note that, once budget is expended, other eligible proposals
are discarded. Therefore, only top-ranked proposals that fit
within the available budget are funded in an automated process
that requires synchronisation of the proposal rankings among
masternodes and communication on the network. As earlier
mentioned, the total budget for any voting period is gotten
from taxation of miners’ block rewards, and is calculated as
follows: Budget = (Block reward ∗ 0.1) ∗ 16616 blocks.
C. Discussion
DGS employ off-chain systems in the decision-making
process. A potential issue arises as a result of reliance on data
(voting and proposal) which are not stored on the blockchain.
Reliance on off-chain data could make system susceptible to
validation attacks leading to forks on the blockchain.
Moreover, voting on the DGS is not private, as a result,
voters can be subjected to coercion from a powerful adversary.
Currently, the DGS does not support proxy voting (delegation)
or liquid democracy. Liquid democracy allows members of
the community take advantage of experts within a community.
This is in addition to the scaling advantage it provides to the
system. That is, when the system grows and there are enor-
mous amounts of proposals to vote for, it will be practically
impossible for (non-technical) members of the community
to thoroughly evaluate the merits of all submitted proposals.
Therefore, by relying on experts through vote delegation, they
can easily be more confident of their voting decision.
Participation in the DGS is currently not incentivised, and
this might perhaps explain the low level of Masternode (stake-
holder) participation generally experienced on DGS decision
making. Finally, additional funding sources for the DGS
treasury may be necessary as sole reliance on taxation may
not be sufficient for future budgeting, considering the fact that
miners’ reward decreases by about 7% annually on the Dash
network.
VI. CASE STUDY: ZCASH TREASURY
ZCash Electronic Coin Company is the organisation respon-
sible for building the Zcash cryptocurrency. Zcash is a privacy-
centric proof of work mining-based cryptocurrency that utilises
zk-snarks as its fundamental building block and was founded
by the Zero Electric Coin Company [11]. The company serves
the interests of founders, investors and developers of the Zcash
coin. 20% of all block mining rewards are paid to the company
under a scheme termed Founder’s rewards. Next, we explore
ZCash’s approach to treasury.
A. Zcash Foundation
Recently, Zcash community members can propose projects
for the zcash cryptocurrency through the Zcash foundation.
Particularly, the Zcash foundation through its GitHub Grant
Proposal Page [12] requests community members to submit
proposals that fall within the foundation’s defined scope,
as well as support the overall mission and vision of the
foundation. The Zcash foundation has a board responsible
for its projects. Only 5 members voted in the Q4-2017
round of budget approval that approved 300 ZEC (approx-
imately $80, 000) as the amount available for community-
driven projects. Nonetheless, the board has the power to fund
projects in excess of this approved amount at the board’s
discretion.
B. Proposal and Submissions
Community members with proposals wishing to be con-
sidered for funding need first submit an informal detailed de-
scription of their proposals (on GitHub). Following this, based
on comments, critiques, suggestions and feedback from other
community members, proposal owners submit a revised formal
version of their initial proposals (on GitHub as well). A fixed
committee of 5 reviewers (aka Zcash Foundation Grant Review
Committee appointed by Zcash foundation then considers all
submitted proposals and decide on the winning proposals (that
receive funding) based on comments and the proposals (or by
making additional consultations where necessary).
Proposal submissions are expected to contain information
about the following [12]: Motivation and overview, technical
approach, team background and qualification, plan, security
considerations, schedule, budget and justification. The details
provided under each of the listed sections are the basis upon
which comments, critiques, and suggestions are raised before
a final proposal submission is made.
Final formal proposal submissions are to be made via
attachments to the original (informal) submissions on the
“Zcash Foundation Grants: Call for Proposals”. In summary,
the submission process involves users submitting their pro-
posals, and community members providing comments, and
suggestions for improvements. Proposal files are issues (on the
Zcash foundation dedicated GitHub repository) which contains
details about the proposals.
C. Funding/Treasury Period, Payment and Monitoring
Typically, a funding cycle is a period of about three months.
During the first month, calls for proposals are released and
filing deadlines for initial submissions are approximately
one month from the date of call for proposals. Following
this, discussions and comments and critiquing of submissions
are then expected to take place. Final submissions (with
possible corrections and improvements from discussions and
feedbacks) are then expected to be submitted approximately
twenty-one days from the initial submissions. Thereafter, the
Zcash Foundation Grant Review Committee review the pro-
posals and provide funding decisions (which also requires the
approval of the Zcash Foundation Board) in approximately one
month. Therefore, the Zcash Foundation Grant runs a quarterly
treasury period.
Payment is made in a single lump sum in the ZEC equivalent
of the fiat currency requested in an approved proposal. As
a means of ensuring transparency and future evaluations,
proposers of funded projects are required to provide progress
reports six months after receiving funding.
D. Funded Proposals
In October 2016, the first funded project was a contest
(Zcash Open Source Miner Challenge ), operated by Least-
Authority.com (a company that supports Zcash Electric Coin
Company), to support projects that would encourage wide and
open source mining of the ZEC in order to further strengthen
the Zcash cryptocurrency. $30, 000 was paid in rewards to the
top 5 winning projects selected by a panel of 3 judges.
The first set of of funding made by the Zcash Founda-
tion (from revenues obtained from the Founder’s rewards)
was the award of 33 ZEC each to three recipients under
the “Test Transaction Awards”. This was an award made to
three vibrant members of the Zcash community who have
consistently developed tools and solutions that support Zcash.
Following the award, announcement about the launch of the
Zcash Foundation Grant program was made to encourage other
community members to participate in the development of the
cryptocurrency whilst taking advantage of available funding.
Although, the process raised awareness about the Zcash
Foundation Grant scheme, the community was not a part of the
decision making process in selecting the deserving members.
Similarly, the community also played no part in the process
of selecting the winning proposals of the Zcash Open Miner
Challenge.
E. Discussion
Clearly, the Zcash model of treasury does not scale for a
cryptocurrency with a huge number of proposals to consider.
When the Zcash system grows and there are hundreds of pro-
posal submissions, it is practically infeasible for each member
of the Foundation Grant Review Committee to scrupulously
review each proposal to determine its credibility and utility.
Moreover, relying on a select number of reviewers appointed
by a board (that grants final approval and also determines
the amount of funds available for funding proposals ) is not
representative of a decentralised, open and inclusive system
that blockchain systems (cryptocurrencies) represent. Clearly,
a better and alternative approach would be to accommodate a
larger number of community members (or possibly all willing
members) in the decision-making process.
Having, a 5 member committee examine all proposals
on a decentralised blockchain system is clearly problematic,
particularly considering that the members of the committee can
also submit proposals of their own. For example, in the last
funding round, one of the members was unavoidably absent,
thereby limiting the team strength to 4. Some proposals were
reviewed by only 3 reviewers due to conflict of interest by one
of the review team members who also submitted a proposal.
Note that although the Zcash Calls for Proposals states that
Review committee members must exclude themselves from
the discussion of their own proposals, there are still subtle
ways in which a committee member can still influence their
proposals towards getting funded. For instance, a committee
member who has submitted a proposal and has knowledge of
the approved budget for proposals, can deliberately down-vote
or negatively review other projects under consideration, such
that total budget request of all approved proposals is less than
the available budget. Thereby, increasing the chances for the
acceptance of the member’s proposal.
Furthermore, while the feedback process of the initial sub-
mission is desirable and helps the overall quality of proposals
submitted to the system, only a limited amount of members
from the large Zcash or cryptocurrency community partic-
ipate in this process. Definitely, a system that encourages
participation among all community members, such as delega-
tive democracy (a collaborative decision making mechanism),
would represent an improvement over the approach deployed
in the Zcash Foundation Grant process. Another significant
drawback of the funding mechanism of the Zcash Foundation
Grant system is the non-use of the Zcash blockchain at any
point in the decision-making process. Funding decisions on a
blockchain-based cryptocurrency should leverage the facilities
the blockchain can provide to improve the decision-making
process. For, instance, secure time-stamping of final proposals,
commitment(hashing) of proposal submissions, voting in the
decision making process, tamper-proof “locking” of voting and
funding decisions, etc.
Moreover, at any point in future, it is not particularly clear
how much money would be available for funding proposals. In
other words, at any particular time in the system, the amount
of community-driven projects or proposals is solely dependent
on the approved budget by Foundation Board. Although, the
Zcash Foundation Board is empowered to make discretionary
approvals above a budget for any particular quarter, the un-
certainty about available budget may thus inhibit the amount
of development proposals that the community can contribute
to the overall development of the cryptocurrency. Therefore,
an alternative solution, such as “decentralised treasury pool”
represents a better solution for the system.
In conclusion, because the system is relatively new, it is
expected that the system will evolve with time and some of the
issues raised will be addressed. For instance, there are plans to
implement some changes to the system, e.g., the establishment
of “Working Groups” for monitoring volunteers/proposers.
Furthermore, information on the Zcash Foundation Grant
GitHub page also corroborates the suggestion that there are
plans to evolve the system into an “open-community review
process”.
VII. CASE STUDY: ETHEREUM FOUNDATION
In the Ethereum blockchain, the bulk of discussions and
analyses revolve around governance system rather than trea-
sury system. It is important to note that a governance system
is not the same as a treasury system, although, both systems
support long-term sustainability of blockchain technologies.
Most importantly, a treasury system handles and ensures reg-
ular funding and decision-making on fund usage, a governance
system is mainly concerned with general blockchain and
protocol rules such as soft-forks and hard-forks. A governance
system determines how and when changes are made to a
blockchain’s core.
Similar to the Bitcoin Foundation, the Ethereum Founda-
tion is a not-for-profit Swiss that supports Ethereum through
research, development and education [13]. Like the Bitcoin
Foundation, the Ethereum foundation also relies on donations
as its primary source of funding for Ethereum development and
research. Basically, the foundation uses donations to support
“general” Ethereum development activities. However, donors
can specify specific projects for which their donations can be
used for (provided the foundation supports such projects).
Although, the Ethereum blockchain does not have a treasury
system, it supports development projects through grants to
support research that would improve blockchains. For ex-
ample, the programs referred to as subsidy programs was
established to support projects on sharding and layer-two
protocols that would improve blockchain scalability. Teams,
researchers, developers, who do relevant work in this area
can apply for support through a process described as “flexible
to accommodate various needs of different applicants”. The
Ethereum core leadership is responsible for deciding what
proposals are funded, with funding amounts of $50, 000 up
to $1 million. Clearly, this encourages open and community-
wide participation, however, the core leadership wields much
power in the decision-making process.
Critics of decentralised governance argue that adaptation
of blockchain protocols to changes is slow on systems with
decentralised governance due to the minimum requirements for
approval being high. They argue that decentralisation consti-
tutes the major point of arguments against existing off-chain or
traditional blockchain governance model. Critics further argue
that a side-effect of decentralised on-chain governance is the
ability of a rich minority (with very substantial amount of
stake) to have over-bearing influence on decision-making via
a voting process.
Other highlighted criticisms or suggested factors that hinder
on-chain voting governance are low participation (or voter
turnout) and unequal wealth distribution. Within Ethereum,
for instance, Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 186 Car-
bonvote, with approximately 2.7 million ETH voting had less
than 20% voter turnout. About 11% is the highest voter
turnout of any current proposal on the DAO with about 23, 606
unique Ethereum addresses holding tokens (aka DTH - DAO
Token Holders). However, low-voter turn-out is not peculiar to
blockchain voting. According to FairVote, established democ-
racies such as the United Kingdom and United States also
experience low voter turnout. For instance, only about 60% of
eligible voters participated in the 2016 US national elections.
Similarly, the 2015 UK elections recorded about 66.6% voter
turnout.
However, the problem of low voter incentive and low
voter turnout can be addressed through clever incentives
engineering, by rewarding participants who take part in elec-
tions. Furthermore, novel voting mechanisms such as liquid
democracy mitigate some of the well-known raised issues that
affect traditional voting schemes. For instance, these issues
are addressed by delegative/liquid democracy where users
effectively assign their voting powers to other (better qualified)
members of the voting community. Members who receive
delegation usually possess more subject-matter expertise and
knowledge, and are renowned within the ecosystem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We highlight the sustainability of funding for blockchain
platforms. We examine various sources of blockchain funding
and categorise treasury system models. Treasury systems are
relatively novel within blockchain research, and cryptocurren-
cies that deploy treasury systems, e.g., Dash cryptocurrency,
have benefited from its adoption.
However, a number of issues continue to affect improved
adoption and success of pioneer treasury systems. These
include inadequate design analysis, security, privacy and game-
theoretic analysis of the systems before they were developed
and deployed. It is evident from the systems reviewed that
they were created ad-hoc and changes (not necessarily backed
by research evidence) were made as the systems mature. Little
or no analytical proofs of security and overall security goals
and requirements of these systems are provided.
Finally, despite being an interesting solution to sustainable
blockchain funding , treasury systems require careful design
and analysis to avoid issues that will hinder their utility.
Notably, utmost consideration should be given to source of
treasury funds, management, decision-making (e.g., voting
rule and systems such as liquid democracy, receipt-free vot-
ing), partitionary budgeting, usability, security and privacy,
incentives for stakeholders, game-theoretic analysis, cryptocur-
rency inflation and blockchain (resource) utilisation.
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